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Nix: Torts

TORTS1
I.
A.

NEGLIGENCE

Standard of Care

South Carolina case law concerning electrical contact torts
has developed in harmony with general negligence law. 2 The supreme court's decision in Foreman v. Atlantic Land Corp.,3 however, introduces uncertainty into this area of the law by failing
to clarify the duty of care required of the power company in
insulating wires and posting warning signs.
Foreman and Talbott, employees of the American Boring
and Tunnelling Company, received electrical shock injuries when
a crane operated by an alleged employee of the Atlantic Land
Corporation came into contact with a South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company4 power line. Foreman and the administratrix of
Talbott's estate brought suit claiming that SCE&G had been
negligent in maintaining its high voltage lines.5
The standard of care adopted by the court in Foreman requires compliance with the National Electric Safety Code. Three
cases provided the court with authority for adopting the NESC
as the standard of care;' in these cases, however, compliance
served merely as evidence of the defendant power companies' due
care rather than as a distinct standard of care. Nonetheless, the
South Carolina Supreme Court placed more significance on the
power company's compliance with the safety code than did the
three foreign courts by adopting the requirements of the code as
the standard governing the duty to insulate power lines and by
incorporating compliance as one facet of a two-part test to determine the need for warning signs in a particular case. 7
On the issue of power line insulation the court held that a
1. Products liability is treated in Products Liability, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 101 (1979).
2. An example of the South Carolina Supreme Court's approach to this area of the
law is Elliot v. Black River Elec. Coop., 233 S.C. 233, 104 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
3. 271 S.C. 130, 245 S.E.2d 609 (1978).
4. Hereinafter referred to as SCE&G.
5. 271 S.C. at 132, 245 S.E.2d at 610.
6. Nelson v. Iowa-Ill. Gas and Elec. Co., 160 N.W.2d 448 (Iowa 1968); Dillard v.
Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 73 N.M. 40, 385 P.2d 564 (1963); Virginia Elec. and Power
Co. v. McCleese, 206 Va. 127, 141 S.E.2d 755 (1965).
7. 271 S.C. at 132-33, 245 S.E.2d at 610.
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power company's failure to further insulate a line situated at a
"sufficient height in compliance with safety codes" does not constitute negligence. 8 Compliance with the safety code in some situations may be accomplished by satisfying the minimum height
requirements; where these requirements are not applicable in
light of the circumstances, other safety code provisions must be
the guide.' While the court apparently sets forth the National
Electric Safety Code as the required standard of care applicable
to power companies, the final portions 10 of the Foreman opinion
inject ambiguity into the process of discerning the exact standard
of care required. The court apparently considers the standard of
care to be a general foreseeability standard, i.e., power lines need
not be insulated if their heights render tortious contacts reasonably unforeseeable. The court never provides a summation of the
standard of care required of the power company; thus, one is left
with two possible interpretations of the required standard: compliance with the requirements of the safety code or compliance
with a general foreseeability standard. A reading of the Foreman
opinion raises doubts that either of these interpretations alone is
sufficient. The practitioner handling an electrical contact case
should cautiously avoid focusing on less than the entire opinion
in arguing the power company's breach of duty.
Appellants in Foreman also argued that SCE&G was negligent in failing to post warning signs in the area. The court disagreed with the appellants and set forth a two-part standard to
determine when warning signs are unnecessary. The first part of
the standard requires a determination of whether the lines were
"sufficiently elevated." 1 Considering the court's approach to the
isolation/insulation standard, the meaning of "sufficiently elevated" is not clear. The second determination is whether the
crane operator was aware of the danger involved. Although this
formulation appears straightforward, the precise level of aware8. The court stated that "[ilt is uncontroverted that the wire height at the accident
scene was 29 feet, above the minimum of 22 feet set by the National Electric Safety Code.
While this Code has no legislative sanction, it is difficult to conceive a better test of care
than compliance with its provisions." Id. at 132, 245 S.E.2d at 610 (citations omitted).
9. Although National Electric Safety Code Rule 232 governs height requirements, it
merely sets forth minimum requirements which apply only to areas whose descriptions fit
those set forth in Rule 232. Since the area involved in Foreman did not fit any category
under Rule 232, Rule 202 applied. Rule 202 requires that lines be placed at heights above
the minimum level if certain local conditions exist.
10. 271 S.C. at 133-34, 245 S.E.2d at 611.
11. Id. at 133, 245 S.E.2d at 610.
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ness required of the crane operator is not clearly enunciated. Furthermore, the court said that if these two conditions were met,
warnings would serve no purpose. Presumably if a plaintiff could
demonstrate that warnings would serve a purpose, a duty to warn
might arise."
B.

Contributory Negligence

The South Carolina "railroad statute"'3 provides for the recovery of a penalty or damages for injuries received at railroad
crossings when the railroad corporation fails to give the signals

required by the statute. The statute allows an injured party to
recover despite his lack of care unless his negligence was gross or
wilful. The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that
the provision creates a statutory cause of action;' 4 a federal decision has held that accordingly the statute must be strictly construed.' 5
Central of Georgia Railway v. Walker Truck Contractors'6

presented the South Carolina Supreme Court with the novel
question of whether section 58-17-1440 could be charged to a jury
in a common-law railroad suit." Prior to Central, the statute had
been invoked only in a suit brought under the section itself. In
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-17-1440 (1976). The statute provides:

If a person is injured in his person or property by collision with the engine
or any car of a railroad corporation at a crossing and it appears that the corporation neglected to give the signals required by the General Railroad Law and that
such neglect contributed to the injury, the corporation shall be liable for all
damages caused by the collision or to a fine recoverable by indictment, unless
it is shown that in addition to a mere want of ordinary care the person injured
or the person having charge of his person or property was at the time of the
collision guilty of gross or wilful negligence or was acting in violation of the law
and that such gross or wilful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the
injury.
Id.
14. King v. Southern Ry. Co., 249 S.C. 236, 153 S.E.2d 690 (1967).
15. Whilton v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 57 F. 551 (C.C.D.S.C. 1893).
16. 270 S.C. 533, 243 S.E.2d 923 (1978).
17. The essence of the charge, according to defendant-respondent, was the following:
If the jury determined that the statutory signals, required by § 58-15-910, were
not given by the railroad, and that such failure to give the statutory signals was
a proximate cause of the accident, . . . in order for the railroad to defeat the
Defendant's assertion of the railroad's comparative negligence, the railroad
would have to show that the Defendant's driver was guilty of gross or wilful
negligence, that such negligence contributed to the accident and was equal to,
or greater than, the negligence of the Defendant.
Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 42.
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all but one prior federal case," the statute had been used
"offensively" by the injured plaintiff suing a defendant railroad
company.
Central of Georgia Railway alleged that one of its locomotives had sustained damages as the result of defendant's truck
being negligently and recklessly driven into the path of the locomotive. Plaintiff argued that section 58-17-1440 only created a
statutory cause of action in favor of the parties injured in railroad
crossing accidents. The statute was not, according to the plaintiff, to be applied to a common-law action brought by a railroad
company to recover damages done to its locomotive. A strict construction of the provision was requested. 9
Defendant disagreed with plaintiff's contention that the statute could be applied only when the railroad was the defendant.
The statute, according to defendant, merely modified the
common-law duty of care required of those using railroad crossings when it is proved that the railroad has not given the proper
signals."0 The defendant focused on the purposes of the statutory
crossing signals recognized in Lawrence v. Southern Railway,
Carolina Division" - "to warn the unwary"22 and to arouse the
motorist approaching a railroad crossing who might be
"momentarily abstracted or inadvertent." Arguably, these purposes would be met by invoking the statute whenever the facts
allowed, regardless of whether the railroad company was the
plaintiff or the defendant in the action.24
The supreme court cited no authority in support of its ruling
that the railroad statute could be invoked in the factual context
of Central. Perhaps citation of authority was unnecessary in this
instance; although the earlier use of the statute had been re18. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Owen Steel Co., 348 F. Supp. 1363 (D.S.C. 1972)
recognized that a defendant could rely on the provisions as a shield against a suit by a
railroad company for property damage.
19. 270 S.C. at 538, 243 S.E.2d at 926.
20. Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 44.
21. 169 S.C. 1, 167 S.E. 839 (1933).
22. Id. at 12-13, 167 S.E. at 843.
23. Id.
24. In Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Owen Steel Co., 348 F. Supp. 1363 (D.S.C. 1972),
the district court recognized that section 58-17-1440 could be used by a motorist injured
at a railroad crossing either as a plaintiff suing the negligent railroad company or as a
defendant being sued by the negligent railroad company. The case was not factually on
point with Central because it was tried under the comparative negligence statute.
Defendant-respondent argued Seaboard in its brief, but plaintiff-appellant did not deal
with the case either in its brief or reply brief.
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stricted to actions brought by a motorist injured in a railroad
crossing accident, the text of the statute itself provides no indication that it could not be applied in a situation like Central.
In light of Central,the practitioner should be aware that the
applicability of section 58-17-1440 is subject to the following considerations: first, as originally recognized, the statute can apply
in actions brought under the statute by motorists against railroad
companies;s secondly, general principles of contributory negligence apply to common law suits brought by motorists against
railroad companies, but the statute does not; 21 thirdly, the statute
may be applied in cases that involve railroad
companies bringing
2
common law suits against motorists.

1

C. Proximate Cause-Causationin Fact
The concepts of causation in fact and proximate cause are
two distinct concepts of negligence law which are often hopelessly
confused. After establishing that the defendant's conduct has in'
fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury, the proximate
cause issue remains to be resolved. 2s As Prosser explains, the
proximate cause issue is "essentially a question of whether the
policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to
the consequences which have in fact occurred. 2' 9 General concepts of justice and administrative possibility and convenience
are factors frequently considered in relation to proximate cause
issues, but such policy considerations have no connection with
30
the question of causation in fact.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Green v.
Lilliewood"' unquestionably blurs the distinction between these
two concepts. Green involved a medical malpractice suit brought
by a school teacher and her husband 2 against a specialist in
25. King v. Southern Ry. Co., 249 S.C. 236, 153 S.E.2d 690 (1967).
26. Id.
27. 270 S.C. 533, 243 S.E.2d 923 (1978).
28. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 244 (4th ed. 1971).
29. Id.
30. Id., § 41 at 237.
31. S.C. __, 249 S.E.2d 910 (1978).
32. Mrs. Mary G. Green brought suit for personal injuries as a result of alleged
medical negligence of Dr. Lilliewood. Her husband, James Green, Jr., brought a companion action for medical expenses and loss of consortium. The cases were tried together, with
the determination of Mrs. Green's case on appeal being understood to settle her husband's
case. Record at i.
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obstetrics and gynecology. The lower court granted Dr. Lilliewood's motion for a directed verdict because no cause and effect
relationship was shown between the defendant's negligence and
the plaintiff's injuries. 3 The briefs of appellant and respondent
first stated the issue on appeal as one of causation in fact, 4 but
presented their arguments in terms of proximate cause and causation. 5 The court's opinion in Green adopted almost the same
approach.
One is left to conclude that the parties to the Green suit and
the supreme court all meant "causation in fact" when they employed the term "proximate cause." The practitioner relying on
the Green opinion should recognize the court's tendency to use
the terms interchangeably. 7 Much confusion will thus be avoided
by the attorney who conceptualizes negligence law in accordance
with Prosser.
H.

A.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

ConditionalImmunity

The South Carolina Supreme Court, in Hanselmann v.
McCardle,35 was presented with the opportunity to consider the
extent of immunity from tort liability enjoyed by county employees, but the majority opinion provides little insight into precisely
what immunity such employees can expect.
Sommai Hanselmann died from complications associated
with the disease hemotysis. The estate of the deceased brought
wrongful death and pain and suffering actions against three physicians, their professional associations, a laboratory technician,
and a laboratory aide. The estate claimed that Edwards, the
laboratory technician, and Brooks, the laboratory aide, did not
follow specified laboratory procedures and reported test results
connected with the deceased's illness without exercising proper
care. At trial, the two Richland Memorial Hospital employees
demurred on the ground that as public employees they enjoyed
33. Id.
34. Brief of Appellants at 5; Brief of Respondent at 1.
35. Brief of Appellants at 6, 7; Brief of Respondent at 1, 4.
36.

-

S.C.

,

249 S.E.2d 910, passim.

37. The Green opinion is not the first time the supreme court has used the terms
'"proximate cause" and "causation" interchangeably. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Weiland, 267
S.C. 12, 16, 225 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1976).
38. 270 S.C. 367, 242 S.E.2d 421 (1978).
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immunity from suit for their discretionary official acts committed
without malice. The trial court denied the demurrer and defendants appealed.
In affirming the lower court's denial of the demurrer, the
supreme court recognized that public employees like Edwards
and Brooks are not as a matter of law immune from tort liability
under the facts presented. Defendants-appellants argued that the
3
common-law immunity rule established in Long v. Seabrook, 1
should be applied. 0 Long recognized that "[iln a tort suit
against a public official whose duties are discretionary, it must
be shown that in the performance or nonperformance of those
duties the public official was guilty of corruption, or bad faith,
or influenced by malicious motives, before a recovery can be
had." 4
Responding to appellants' reliance on Long, plaintiffrespondent argued that the present case was distinguishable from
Long on three points. First, the respondent argued that a laboratory technician and aide are distinguishable from the "public
official" who was the defendant in Long.4" Secondly, the acts of
Edwards and Brooks were ministerial, whereas the acts complained of in Long were discretionary. 3 Appellants maintained in
response that the methods of testing and sample analysis necessarily required discretion on the parts of Edwards and Brooks and
that the method of transmitting the results of the tests was not
prescribed by law with sufficient precision to "leave nothing to
the discretion of the official on whom the duty is imposed."44
Finally, the respondent argued that the acts complained of in
Long were ex delicto whereas the acts of Edwards and Brooks
were ex contractu.45 Appellant refused to admit this as an issue
because the respondent had not alleged any contractual relationship in the pleadings."
In the context of these arguments, the court's response that
39. 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973).
40. Brief of Appellants (Pain and Suffering) at 4; Brief of Appellants (Wrongful
Death) at 4.
41. 260 S.C. at 569, 197 S.E.2d at 662.
42. Brief of Respondent at 13, 14, Hanselmann v. McCardle, 270 S.C. 367, 242 S.E.2d
421 (1978).
43. Id. at 14. Appellants considered the ministerial/discretionary distinction to be the
central disagreement between the parties. Reply Brief of Appellants at 2.
44. Reply Brief of Appellants at 3.
45. Brief of Respondent at 14.
46. Reply Brief of Appellants at 1.
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the "scope of immunity, if any"4 should be decided at trial arguably reveals the court's uncertainty whether the defendants were
"public officials" performing "discretionary duties," as was the
case in Long. Terming the issue before it a "critical" one, the
court further admits the novelty of the question raised. Although
the court in Hanselmann considered the issue of conditional
immunity to be best decided at trial, it did not adopt the same
approach when, in a later case, the issue of absolute governmental immunity arose.4"
B.

Absolute Governmental Immunity

Despite the persuasive arguments that can be made to the
contrary, the South Carolina Supreme Court continues to adhere
to the doctrine of absolute governmental immunity from tort liability. Wright v. City of North Charleston49 provided the court
with an opportunity to either completely overrule the doctrine or,
alternatively, to resurrect a previously recognized rule allowing
recovery from municipalities for personal injuries occurring in
city parks and playgrounds. The supreme court refused to do
either.
Plaintiff sued the City of North Charleston for personal injuries resulting from a defect in a merry-go-round located in a public park under defendant's control. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer. On appeal, the supreme court focused solely
on the question of whether governmental immunity had been
waived by the state under South Carolina Code section 5-7-70,11
thus permitting plaintiff's cause of action. The section provides:
Any person who shall receive bodily injury or danger in his
person or property through a defect in any street, causeway,
bridge or public way or by reason of a defect or mismanagement
of anything under control of the corporation within the limits of
any city or town may recover in an action against such city or
town the amount of actual damages sustained by him by reason
thereof if such person has not in any way brought about any
such injury or damage by his own negligent act or negligently
contributed thereto.5
47.
48.
49.
50.

270 S.C. at 369, 242 S.E.2d at 422.
Wright v. City of North Charleston, 271 S.C. 534, 248 S.E.2d 480 (1978).
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-70 (1976).

51. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/12

8

Nix: Torts

1979]

TORTS

The statute on its face allows recovery for bodily injury
caused "by reason of a defect [in] . . .anything under control
of the corporation within the limits of any city ... ."I' This
statute was interpreted by some early South Carolina cases to
impose liability upon cities for injuries occurring in public parks
and playgrounds.3
The last case to so interpret the statute was a 1920 case,
Haithcock v. City of Columbia,5 4 upon which plaintiff relied. The
subsequent decisions by the supreme court, however, have rejected Haithcock and the earlier cases which had held cities liable
under the statute. The decisions in Hicks v. City of Columbia5
and Furrv. City of Rock Hill,5" relying on a 1932 case, Reeves v.
City of Easley,5" completely eroded the Haithcock decision.
Reeves recognized that the words of the statute "by reason of
defect or mismanagement of anything under the control of the
corporation" relate to instrumentalities used to maintain the
streets, causeways, bridges, or public ways for safe travel.-, This
strict construction approach invoked in Reeves was determinative for the court in Wright.
Wright sounds the death knell for any hope of reverting to
the Haithcock rationale. Apparently, the only authority that will
persuade the South Carolina Supreme Court to abrogate municipalities' immunity from liability for negligence is a statute explicitly providing for the elimination of the immunity.
Wright provided a superb opportunity for the South Carolina
Supreme Court to hold the municipality liable for its negligence.
The court had before it a statute which ostensibly provided the
plaintiff with a cause of action against the city. In addition, the
court had available South Carolina case law interpreting the statute favorably to the plaintiff. The recognition of a cause of action
in this case would not have required any "judicial legislating" by
the court. 5 While the supreme court had expressed reservations
52.
53.
89 S.C.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
County

Id.
See, e.g., Stone v. Florence, 94 S.C. 375, 78 S.E. 23 (1913); Irvine v. Greenwood,
511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
115 S.C. 29, 104 S.E. 335 (1920).
225 S.C. 553, 83 S.E.2d 199 (1954).
235 S.C. 44, 109 S.E.2d 697 (1959).
167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120 (1932).
Id. at 253, 166 S.E. at 128.
The supreme court recognized its "legislative" powers in Brown v. Anderson
Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 486, 234 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1977).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1979

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

about the doctrine of governmental immunity in an earlier case,
Belton v. Richland Memorial Hospital, 0 the depth of the court's
reservations is questionable in light of the Wright opinion.
The legislature should give serious consideration to reforming this area of the law. As the appellant argued in Wright, simple
justice dictates that immunity should be the exception rather
than the rule; "[i]t is not

. . .

better for an individual to suffer

a grievious wrong than to impose liability on the people vicariously through their government. 5 61 The availability of liability
insurance to municipalities would cushion the adverse effects of
tort suits brought against municipalities.
C. Statutory Immunity
During the 1978 legislative term, the General Assembly also
dealt with the issue of immunity from tort liability. The legislature passed an act"2 exempting duly appointed members of state
or local professional societies and medical staff peer review committees from tort liability. 3 Such immunity covers:
Any act or proceeding undertaken or performed within the scope
of the functions of any such committee if such committee member acts without malice, has made a reasonable effort to obtain
the facts relating to the matter under consideration and acts in
the belief that the action taken by him is warranted by the facts
known to him."
60. 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975). The court maintained:
We recognize that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been assailed on

many fronts and has been abolished or modified in more than one-half of the
states either by judicial decision or by statute. While we have serious reservations about the soundness and fairness of the doctrine and do not question the
authority of the courts to abolish it, we adhere to the view that reform in this
field should be left to the legislature.
Id, at 451, 211 S.E.2d at 243.
61. Brief of Appellant at 3, Wright v. City of North Charleston, 271 S.C. 534, 248
S.E.2d 480 (1978).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-10 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
63. Compare this statute with the holding in Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n:
[A]nyone injured through tortious acts of commission or omission of the agents,
servants, employees or officers of a charitable hospital in this state may recover
damages against such hospital if the aggrieved party can establish that the
injuries occurred because of the hospital's heedlessness and reckless disregard
of the plaintiff's rights.
268 S.C. at 487, 234 S.E.2d at 876-77.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-10 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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The ten "professional societies"65 covered by the act must meet
a special membership requirement" to fall within the ambit of
the statute. The act has no application to an officer or employee
of a public corporation.
II.

Vicmous LLBiLrrY

The South Carolina Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying South Carolina law, were asked to
determine whether an employer should be liable for the actionable wrong committed by its employee. Faced with different factual situations, the courts came to different conclusions. Both
cases serve to indicate the difficulty in maintaining a summary
judgment ruling on the issue of vicarious liability.
The respondeat superior doctrine is generally invoked to obtain recovery from the master for injuries committed by the servant's negligent acts." Modern courts have also recognized that
the doctrine can be applied to hold the master responsible for the
intentional acts of the servant." If the master should have foreseen the possibility of the servant's tortious act in light of the
servant's duties, the master will be held liable.69 The intentional
tort must be so reasonably connected with the agent's duties that
it is within the scope of his employment. 0 Accordingly, masters
have been held liable for assaults by their servants.7 South Carolina law has previously recognized an employer's vicarious liability for assault committed by an employee.72
In Jamison v. Howard,73 plaintiff Jamison sought recovery
65. The ten societies covered by the statute are legal, medical, osteopathic, optometric, chiropractic, psychological, dental, accounting, pharmaceutic and engineering organizations. Id.
66. The professional societies covered by the statute must have "as members at least
a majority of the eligible licentiates in the area served by the particular society and any
foundations composed of members of such societies." Id.
67. See W. SEAvEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 87, at 148 (1964); W. PROSSER, supra note 28,
§ 69, at 458.
68. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 70, at 464.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1957).
70. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 70 at 464.
71. See Tarman v. Southard, 205 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (taxi driver ran over
customer during a dispute between the two about a fare); Dilli v. Johnson, 107 F.2d 669
(D.C. Cir. 1939) (waiter beat patron when the latter threatened to report a complaint to
the owner); Munick v. City of Durham, 181 N.C. 188, 106 S.E. 665 (1921) (assault by
angered agent following plaintiff's tender of fifty pennies in payment of a bill).
72. Jones v. Elbert, 206 S.C. 508, 34 S.E.2d 796 (1945).
73. 271 S.C. 385, 247 S.E.2d 450 (1978).
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against Howard, as principal, and Hallums, as Howard's agent,
for his injuries. George Howard, Jr., owner of Howard's Party
Shop in downtown Greenville, hired James Hallums to manage
his business. William Jamison, operator of a Greenville County
nightspot called the Chocolate City Lounge, on several occasions
bought beer and wine on credit from the Party Shop. Jamison's
purchases from the Party Shop were made only in dealings with
the shop's manager, Hallums. Hallums customarily received payment from Jamison whenever Jamison sold the beer and wine.
Jamison never received any indication that credit purchases from
Hallums were not direct purchases from the Party Shop or that
Hallums did not have authority to sell merchandise on credit.
In December 1975, Jamison purchased on credit $189.00
worth of beer and wine from the Party Shop, but the purchases
were subsequently stolen from his place of business. The theft
rendered Jamison unable to pay the Party Shop the amount due.
On two occasions, Hallums attempted to collect the money but
was unsuccessful. Hallums thereafter informed Jamison that the
Party Shop owner had agreed to give Jamison more time to pay
in return for twenty dollars.74
After previous attempts to collect the debt, Hallums and an
acquaintance, Marvin Morgan, visited Jamison in January 1976
seeking payment. Hallums informed Jamison that Howard, the
Party Shop owner, wanted to either receive payment or see Jamison. 75 Jamison asked the identity of Morgan and Morgan responded, "I work with the man sonny, don't you worry about who
I am. ' 7 When Jamison refused to cooperate with them, Hallums
handed Morgan a pistol, which had been given to him by Howard
for use in his work, and instructed Morgan to kill Jamison. As a
result of the gunshot wounds, Jamison was left a paraplegic.
Howard's motion for summary judgment was granted by the
trial court on the ground that there was no evidence that defendant Hallums was acting as Howard's agent at the time of the
alleged assault. Plaintiff appealed the order for summary judgment.
The supreme court concluded that there was evidence to
support a reasonable inference that Hallums acted as Howard's
agent. Significant to the court was Jamison's apparent under74. Record at 17.
75. Brief of Appellant at 5 (citing Record at 17, 18).
76. Record at 18.
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standing that the credit purchases he had made from Hallums
were direct purchases from respondent Howard's Party Shop. In
addition, all inferences from the testimony to the court were that
Hallums gave credit and attempted to collect the debt as the
employee of Howard. The supreme court found that whether Hallums was acting within the scope of Howard's employment was
an issue of material fact which precluded the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant Howard.
The brevity of Chief Justice Lewis' analysis was'the result of
the status of the case as an appeal from an order for summary
judgment. The court's approach was dictated by the premise that
summary judgment should not be granted when the only controversy between the parties is based on divergent conclusions or
inferences drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts." Jamison
indicates the court's eagerness to avoid the use of summary judgment in determining the lack of vicarious liability, thus barring
an injured plaintiff from his day in court. The result in Jamison
does appear consistent with the earlier South Carolina case of
Jones v. Elbert78 which recognized that any factual issue over
whether a servant was acting within the scope of his authority
when he injured a third person should be submitted to the jury."
In the final analysis, the Jamison decision was hastened not
only because of the summary judgment status of the case and the
rule that reasonable inferences are to be settled against the master, but arguably because of the compelling closing statements
made by appellant's counsel: "The case should be remanded...
for a trial by jury on the merits of the case. Only thus may the
appellant be compensated for the terrible and permanent injuries
sustained by him as a result of his failure to pay a $189.00 account
for beer and wine on time.""0
The respondeat superiordoctrine is not the exclusive theory
that may be used to hold a master liable for the acts of his servant. For example, an employer having a nondelegable duty8' to
77. 271 S.C. at 386, 247 S.E.2d at 451.
78. 206 S.C. 508, 34 S.E.2d 796 (1945).
79. Id. at 514-15, 34 S.E.2d at 799.
80. Brief of Appellant at 80, Jamison v. Howard, 271 S.C. 385, 247 S.E.2d 450
(1978).
81. There are three forms of the duty of protection:
First, a person may have a duty to protect another which can be performed
either by exercising care personally in protecting the other or by exercising care
in the employment of an independent contractor to protect the other. Secondly,
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provide protection for others and their property is liable for all
acts of his employees which breach this duty. Common carriers,
innkeepers, and hospitals are held to this duty. 2 Under this nondelegable duty theory, it is not the scope of employment which
determines the extent of the master's liability, but the nature of
the duty assumed by the contract or special agreement entered
into by the parties.
In South Carolina and other jurisdictions, the common carrier owes to its passengers the highest degree of care possible,
within the practical operation of its business.8 4 Most courts, including those in South Carolina, restrict the imposition of this
higher duty to carriers engaged in transportation for hire. 85 This
area of the law, however, is currently undergoing expansion, especially in New York;8" Massachusetts"7 and Illinois 8s have also exthere may be a duty to protect another at all hazards, a duty which is not
fulfilled unless the other is protected and which is not satisfied by the use of
care. This duty normally exists only when undertaken by contract. Thirdly, one
may have a duty to see that due care is used in the protection of another, a duty
which is not satisfied by using care to delegate its performance to another but
is satisfied if, and only if, the person to whom the work of protection is delegated
is careful in giving the protection. In this third class, the duty of care is nondelegable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214, comment a (1957).
82. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 70 at 465.
83. See note 81 supra.
84. See Singletary v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 217 S.C. 212, 60 S.E.2d 305 (1950);
Hutto v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 215 S.C. 90, 54 S.E.2d 523 (1949); Robinson v.
Duke Power Co., 213 S.C. 185, 48 S.E.2d 808 (1948). A common carrier is not an insurer
of the safety of its passengers. See Lentz v. Carolina Scenic Coach Lines, 208 S.C. 278, 38
S.E.2d 11 (1946).
85. S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1895) defined this area by providing:
All railroad, express, canal and other corporations engaged in transportation for
hire and all telegraph and other corporations engaged in the business of transmitting intelligence for hire are common carriers ...
and are subject to liability and taxation as such.
This section, however, was repealed in 1971.
86. In Stone v. William M. Eisen Co., 219 N.Y. 205, 114 N.E. 44 (1916), the court
recognized the higher duty implicitly arising whenever one person is placed in the control
or protection of another, finding such a duty to grow out of "peculiar and special relationships." This view was applied in that case to an employer-customer relationship. In
McKee v. Sheraton-Russell, Inc., 268 F. 2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959), the court held that a guest
could recover for an assault by a hotel employer even without proving that the employee
was acting within the scope of his employment or that the hotel was negligent in hiring
or retaining him.
87. See Crawford v. Hotel Essex Boston Corp., 143 F. Supp. 172 (D. Mass. 1956).
88. See Mizlak v. Ettinger, 25 Ill. App. 3d 706, 323 N.E.2d 796 (1975). Illinois has
enacted a statute extending the higher duty of care normally imposed on common carriers
to private security agencies. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 201-10b(10) (Smith-Hurd 1973).
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tended the common carrier duty. In Rabon v. Guardsmark,Inc.,"9
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue of extending common carrier liability to noncommon carriers.
Melvin Roberts, employed by Guardsmark, Inc. as a security
guard, was assigned to the Hewitt-Robbins plant in Columbia,
South Carolina, to provide protection for the plant and its employees. Pursuant to his employment as a security guard, he carried a loaded thirty-eight caliber pistol for which he was duly
licensed by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. On
Sunday night, January 19, 1975, Lola Rabon was working late at
the plant with her supervisor. As the two left the building, Ms.
Rabon discovered that she had left her car keys behind and returned to the building to get them. When Ms. Rabon returned to
the building, Roberts forcibly assaulted and raped her at gunpoint. Plaintiff Rabon claimed that the assault by Guardsmark's
agent rendered her unable to continue working and caused her
other injuries.
Interpreting the law of South Carolina, the district court
held, and the parties apparently agreed, that the facts of the case
did not bring it within the traditional doctrine of respondeat
superior. The court concluded, however, that a security guard
company such as Guardsmark would be held to the higher standard of care which South Carolina law imposes on common carriers, and that under the facts, this standard of care was clearly
breached by Guardsmark.
Overturning the decision of the district court,90 the Fourth
Circuit of Court of Appeals ruled that no reasoned basis existed
to conclude that the South Carolina Supreme Court would extend
common carrier liability to private security agencies. Specifically, the circuit court disagreed with the lower court by ruling
that the South Carolina Private Detective and Private Security
Agencies Act" merely establishes a licensing scheme and does not
address the civil liability of private security agencies.
Section 40-17-130 of this Act confers upon a licensed security
Under this statute an Illinois federal court, in Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1973), held a security agency liable for a fire
set by one of the agency's guards in a building he was assigned to guard.
89. 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 191 (1978).
90. The dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge K.K. Hall stated, in an emotional tone
that "the voice of all that is right and just cries out for affirmance in this case." 571 F.2d
at 1282 (Hall, J., dissenting).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-17-10 to -170 (1976).
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guard "the authority and power which sheriffs have to make arrest of any persons violating or charged with violating any of the
criminal statutes of this state. 9' 2 Plaintiff Rabon argued, and the

district court agreed, that the legislature's granting of police and
sheriff powers to security guard companies and security guards
evidenced their public service qualities. She argued that as the
duty of protection owed by common carriers arises from its public
service character and the special relationship of carrier to passenger, so also arises the duty of protection owed by a security guard
company to those it protects. The circuit court responded to this
argument by noting three theories (one of which was argued by
the plaintiff) that other jurisdictions had used to support the
higher duty of the common carrier. The court concluded that it
was unable to ascertain which theory, if any, explained the South
Carolina common carrier decisions.94 Thus, from the court's point
of view, no reasoned basis existed to conclude that the supreme
court would extend common carrier liability to private security
agencies.
At least two controlling points of law weakened the persuasiveness of the plaintiff's arguments on the scope of the South
Carolina Private Detective and Private Security Agencies Act.
First, the rule in South Carolina is well-established that commonlaw rules are not changed or overturned except by clear and unambiguous statutory language.9 5 Second, the circuit court had
two years earlier invoked this established rule in determining the
very issue presented in Guardsmark, i.e., whether a licensing and
regulating statute created a higher legal duty. 6
Although not controlling, persuasive authority was provided
by the Seventh Circuit case of Apex Smelting Co. v. Burns. 7 In
92. Id. § 40-17-130.
93. Brief of Respondent at 24.
94. 571 F.2d at 1281 n.5.
95. Coakley v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 194 S.C. 284, 9 S.E.2d 724 (1940); Nuckolls
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 192 S.C. 156, 5 S.E.2d 862 (1939).
96. In Hatfield v. Palles, 537 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1976), the plaintiff was injured in a
fire and resulting explosion in a building used to store fireworks. The building was owned
by the defendant landlord and leased to the plaintiff's father. The plaintiff contended that
the defendant was under a higher duty to keep the premises in a safe condition pursuant
to South Carolina Code provisions which regulated the prevention and investigation of fire
and pursuant to the specific provisions regarding fireworks. The circuit court in Hatfield
disagreed with these contentions, reasoning that to adopt the plaintiffs interpretation of
the Fire Marshall statutes would derogate well-settled rules of common law.
97. 175 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1949).
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Apex, a detective agency subject to licensing and regulation was
exonerated from liability for arson committed by one of the
agency's guards. Only after a clear enactment by the Illinois legislature of a law imposing common carrier liability upon employers
of detective and security guards did the Illinois Federal Court
extend the common carrier standard of care to such an agency."
The circuit court's approach in reaching its decision in
Guardsmark deserves attention. The circuit court indicated that
a "substantial factor" in its decision was the usual deference on
the part of the South Carolina Supreme Court to the state legislature in matters involving a change in the common law. The court
noted the reluctance of the South Carolina courts to expand tort
liability, but at least one of the two examples99 given by the circuit court to illustrate this reluctance undermined the substance
of its argument.
The circuit court stated that "[tihe Supreme Court of
South Carolina has twice declined to abolish or alter the doctrine
of charitable immunity, although it expressed no doubt about its
authority so to do. . . .It took a similar position with respect to
the necessity of the privity of contract requirement in products
liability cases. . ...1oIn so stating, the circuit court completely
ignored a recent decision in which the South Carolina Supreme
Court altered one of the rulings referred to by the circuit court.
In 1977, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Brown v.
Anderson County Hospital Association'0 1 held that
anyone injured through tortious acts of commission or omission
of the agents, servants employees or officers of a charitable hospital in this State may recover damages against such hospital,
if the aggrieved party can establish that the injuries occurred
98. Brief of Appellant at 33-34, Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.
1978).
99. One week before the Guardsmark decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
decided Gasque v. Eagle Machine Company, Ltd., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978).
Gaque abolished "the necessity of privity [of contract] as to any natural person who may
be expected to sue, consume, or be affected by the product, and extend[ed] third party
beneficiary protection to this class of person with respect to both injury and damage to
'person or property"'. Gasque recognized the legislative abolishment of the common-law
doctrine of requiring privity of contract. Although the court in Guardsmarkfailed to cite
Gasque, that decision does support the contention in Guardsmark that the legislature
leads the way in changing rules of common law. For a treatment of Gasque see, Products
Liability, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 31 S.C.L. Rav. 101, 101-07 (1979).
100. 571 F.2d at 1282.
101. 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977).
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because of the hospital's heedlessness and reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights.' 2
Although Brown was limited to hospitals and to causes of actions
arising after May 10, 1977, it nonetheless judicially altered the
doctrine of charitable immunity, contrary to the findings of the
circuit court in Guardsmark.
If the circuit court in Guardsmark had considered Brown,
perhaps it would have reached a different conclusion concerning
the usual deference of the South Carolina Supreme Court to the
legislature in matters involving a change in the common law. The
circuit court's discussion of the deference of the state's highest
court to the legislature could be viewed as mere dictum except
that the circuit court termed its consideration of such deference
a "substantial factor" in its conclusion.
IV.

ToRTious INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGE

Prior to December 1975, Ken Crabb was employed by Sales
Consultants, Inc., an employment agency. In March 1975, Patricia Smith answered an advertisement of Sales Consultants concerning a sales position with Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
(HRW), a national publisher of books. Crabb was assigned by
Sales Consultants to handle negotiations between Smith and
HRW.
In Smith v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 01 3 Smith alleged that
after employment was virtually agreed upon, she learned that
Crabb had been interviewing for the job with HRW, and that he
was given the position for which she had applied. Smith contended that she was never told that an employee of Sales Consultants was being considered for the position, and that Crabb's actions were approved by the employment agency which accepted
a fee from HRW with knowledge that the agency was breaching
a contract with Smith.0 4 Finally, it was alleged that Crabb and
HRW conducted negotiations in secret at the same time that
Smith was interviewing for the position, and that Crabb's actions
constituted a course of double dealing and wilful, deceitful, and
malicious conduct which deprived Smith of the prospective advantage she had in the likelihood of lucrative and permanent
102. Id. at 487, 234 S.E.2d at 876-77.
103. 270 S.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 548 (1978).
104. Record at 3.
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employment with HRW. 115 Upon these allegations, Smith brought
suit against Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Sales Consultants
of Columbia, Inc., and Ken Crabb for "tortious interference with
prospective advantage" a heretofore unrecognized cause of action
in South Carolina.
The trial court recognized the viability of a cause of action
for tortious interference with prospective advantage, but dismissed the complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to support the cause of action. Plaintiff requested permission to amend
her pleadings but the request was denied. On appeal, the supreme
court, in a 3-2 decision, ' ruled that a cause of action for interference with prospective advantage is not recognized in South Carolina.
The cause of action pleaded in Smith runs parallel to that
for interference with existing contracts. °7 The basis for liability
for the tort was originally predicated on malice and the action has
remained essentially an intentional tort.0 8 Prosser recognizes that
cases allowing the tort have "turned almost entirely upon the
defendant's motive or purpose, and the means by which he has
sought to accomplish it. As in the cases of interference with contract, any manner of intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interests may be sufficient if the purpose is not a privileged one."'
Since 1939, the supreme court has recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with contract."' In refusing to extend
the concept to instances where no valid contract is in existence,
the court maintained that no protection is afforded by the law to
rights which are as yet expectancies. The supreme court in Smith
refused to admit the existence of rights unless a present property
right, i.e., a contract, is in existence."'
In modem times it seems that one should have rights in an
105. Id. at 3-4.
106. Justices Rhodes and Ness concurred in the majority opinion written by Justice
Littlejohn. Justice Gregory concurred in the dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice

Lewis.
107. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 130 at 952.

108. Id.
109. Id.

110. Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S.C. 262, 1 S.E.2d 162 (1939). See also Webster v.
Holly Hill Lumber Co., 268 S.C. 416, 234 S.E.2d 232 (1977); Meadows v. South Carolina
Medical Ass'n, 266 S.C. 391, 223 S.E.2d 600 (1976); Crowe v. Domestic Loans, Inc., 242
S.C. 310, 130 S.E.2d 845 (1963); Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.2d 482 (1945); Parker
v. Brown, 195 S.C. 35, 10 S.E.2d 625 (1940).
111. 270 S.C. at 450, 242 S.E.2d at 549-50.
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"expectancy." Prosser applicably quoted and commented that
'in a civilized community which recognizes the right of private
property among its institutions, the notion is intolerable that a
man should be protected by the law in the enjoyment of property once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the law in his
effort to acquire it;'" . . . since a large part of what is most
valuable in modern times depends upon 'probable expectancies,' as social and industrial life becomes more complex the
to discover, define and protect them from
courts must do more
3
influence.1
undue
As the dissenters in Smith argued, there is no sound distinction
between tortious interference with a contractual relationship and
tortious interference with the right to contract: the intent and the
injury are the same.'
The court in Smith could have sustained the demurrers without refusing to recognize the cause of action in South Carolina by
following the approach of the lower court. The lower court found
no allegation of facts to support a finding of breach of any duty
by any of the defendants or any illegal or improper conduct on
their part."'
Although it was not necessary for the South Carolina Supreme Court to refuse to recognize the cause of action in reaching
its result, it was even less necessary for the court to maintain that
the proper way to recognize an action for tortious interference
with prospective advantage was by legislative enactment. The
tort that the plaintiff in Smith asked the court to recognize has
been a part of the common law since a very early date."6 The
court gave no reason why the tort should not have been recognized by "judicial fiat." The court's insistence on deferring such
a recognition to the state legislature unnecessarily hampers future judicial discretion in this area of tort law.
V.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

South Carolina Code Section 16-13-140"1 provides for de112. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 130 at 950 (quoting Brennan v. United Hatters of

N. A., 73 N.J.L. 729, 65 A. 165 (1906)) (footnote added).
113. Id. (citing Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53 A. 230 (1902)).
114. 270 S.C. at 450, 452, 242 S.E.2d at 548, 550 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
115. Record at 8. The dissenters in Smith went a step further than the lower court,
finding the allegations of the plaintiff to be adequate to overcome the demurrers.
116. See W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 130 at 949.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-140 (1976) provides:
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fense to actions arising from a merchant's delay of suspected
shoplifters. In Faulkenberry v. Springs Mills, Inc.,"8 the South
Carolina Supreme Court allowed the statutory defense to be
raised by an employer sued for false imprisonment by an employee.
Barbara Faulkenberry, a Springs Mills employee, was suspected of concealing cloth in her pocketbook. After two separate
reports concerning Ms. Faulkenberry's behavior, she was delayed
by her supervisor and security guards at the mill gatehouse as she
left work. The sole purpose of the fifteen- or twenty-minute delay
was to investigate whether she was attempting to remove her
employer's property. After some discussion and Ms. Faulkenberry's continued refusal to open her pocketbook, she left without
hindrance. She subsequently sued her employer for false imprisonment based upon her delay at the mill gatehouse.
The supreme court applied section 16-13-140 in
Faulkenberry, although that section had previously been applied
only to the merchant-shoplifter situation."9 The Faulkenberry
decision is noteworthy not only because it applies section 16-13140 to a different set of facts, but the decision also provides the
supreme court's interpretation of certain requirements found in
the statute.
Pursuant to section 16-13-140, one sued under the statute
may raise as a part of his defense the fact that reasonable cause
existed to believe that the person delayed had committed the
crime of shoplifting.' 0 Disregarding the statute's requirement of
showing mere "reasonable cause," the supreme court held that
"probable cause" is required by the statute.12 1 While clearly the
court's holding ignores the express words of the statute, the
"probable cause" requirement is arguably preferred. The application of the higher standard of probable cause is in no way foreign
In any action brought by reason of having been delayed by a merchant or
merchant's employee or agent on or near the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation concerning the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense to such action if: (1) The person was delayed in a
reasonable manner and for a reasonable time to permit such investigation, and
(2) reasonable cause existed to believe that the person delayed had committed
the crime of shoplifting.

Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.

271 S.C. 377, 247 S.E.2d 445 (1978).
See Jeffcoat v. K-Mart Discount Stores, 439 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1971).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-140 (1976).
271 S.C. at 386, 247 S.E.2d at 447.
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to a situation in which an individual is delayed as a result of one's
suspicion that a crime has been committed.
Paul Berlin Nix, Jr.
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